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Abstract] Norway maintains one of the highest levels of protection for agriculture in the OECD, 
but the tariff structure is not so transparent due to the extensive use of speciﬁc tariffs, i.e. tariffs 
expressed in NOK/kg or the like. In this paper, we use world market prices and Norwegian import 
prices to calculate ad valorem equivalents of speciﬁc tariffs. This shows that 28% of the tariff lines in 
agriculture are above 100%, and 10% are above 300%. The average of MFN applied tariffs is in the 
range 73-103%, depending on the calculation method. Protection is somewhat lower (54-74%) for 
goods exported by developing countries. While the Least Developed Countries have zero tariffs, other 
developing countries obtain 10-15% tariff reductions under the GSP system of tariff preferences. Tariff 
rate quotas provide some increase in market access. Protection of grains and feedstuff raises the forage 
costs in agriculture, and especially feedstuffs are important in the exports of developing countries.
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1. Introduction1 
It is well known that for agriculture, Norway maintains one of the 
highest levels of protection in the OECD; together with Iceland, Korea, 
Japan and Switzerland. The overall support level at 72% in 20022 was 
the second highest in the OECD. Import protection is one of the pillars 
of this policy. Due to the high incidence of so-called specific tariffs, it is 
not easy to measure the overall level of border protection. This paper 
contributes to this effect by presenting new estimates of ad valorem 
equivalents of the specific tariffs; that we use for examining the regime. 
Being quite liberal for many items not produced in Norway, the 
import regime for agriculture is otherwise restrictive. For fruit and 
vegetables, restrictions are partly seasonal; with high tariffs limited to 
periods following domestic harvesting. More than half of the MFN 
applied tariff lines are specific; i.e. fixed as some value amount per 
quantity unit. In order to obtain an overview of the tariff structure and 
the rate of protection, we need to compare specific tariffs with market 
prices. This also enables us to characterise some aspects of the regime 
more compactly. 
Due to the Uruguay Round, former quantitative restrictions were 
converted into tariffs, with a bound reduction of 36% over six years 
(1995-2001). In St.prp. nr. 59, 1994-95 the Government3 stated “The 
tariffs for agricultural goods, as bound in the WTO, provide for most 
goods a strong protection against imports. The import price plus the 
tariff will in most cases be substantially above the Norwegian price.” 
The extensive use of specific tariffs was also a deliberate step in order to 
provide protection.  
In recent years, the Norwegian Government has carried out 
considerable autonomous liberalisation for manufactured goods. For 
example, in 2002, tariffs were eliminated for 500 tariff lines4. A more 
limited autonomous liberalisation has also occurred for agriculture: 130 
tariffs were eliminated on 1 January 2003, and 40 more in 2004.5  
Due to the Uruguay Round, Norway had to provide some minimum 
access to its market. For this purpose, multilateral tariff quotas have been 
implemented. Additional tariff quotas have also been installed due to 
free trade agreements as well as the GSP system. We shall revert to 
these, as well as administrative tariff exemptions that play some role in 
the Norwegian system.  
 
                                                 
1 Some of this material was presented at the workshop on the WTO Agreement in 
Agriculture in Bergen 2 June 2005. I thank the participants for useful comments. I also 
thank Arild Vatn, Norman Aanesland, Ole Gjølberg and staff at the Norwegian 
Agricultural Authority who supplied useful background information. The standard 
disclaimer applies. 
2 Measured in Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE), see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/0/32361131.xls 
3 Proposition to the Storting from the Ministry of Finance, dated 19 May 1995. 
4 See St.prp. nr. 1, 2001-2002, Skatte-, avgifts- og tollvedtak, Chapter 4 and Appendix. 
5 St.prp. nr. 1, 2002-2003, Skatte-, avgifts- og tollvedtak; and the corresponding 
publication for the Storting 2003-2004. 
2       Arne Melchior 
  
2. Earlier attempts to quantify the Norwegian border protection 
In the so-called “Development Friendliness Index” presented by Birdsall 
and Roodman (2003), Norway dropped several places down in the 
ranking due to high agricultural protection. This was based on Cline 
(2002), who again used estimated tariff equivalents for “EFTA except 
Switzerland” from the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) (Dimaran 
and McDougall 2002, Dimaran 2002). Based on this and weighting by 
world production of the different goods, Cline obtained a high tariff 
average for Norwegian agriculture at 273%! The GTAP estimates were 
however based on bound tariffs, which are – as we shall see – 
considerably above the applied rates.  
An alternative estimate is presented by Bouët et al. (2004), who 
calculate averages of ad valorem and specific tariffs for agriculture for 
several countries. These results are (for some selected countries): 
 
Table 1: Average of ad valorem and non-ad valorem tariffs 
in agriculture 
 Applied including 
all preferences 
MFN applied 
 Ad valorem Non-ad 
valorem 
Ad valorem Non-ad 
valorem 
EU-15 4.9 12.9 6.5 17.0 
Norway 8.7 63.2 4.0 79.3 
USA 1.8 3.3 3.3 5.0 
Canada 13.6 1.2 27.9 1.0 
Japan 8.7 26.4 10.2 45.1 
Switzerland 0 43.1 0 81.1 
Korea 53.5 0 69.9 0 
India 58.7 0.3 58.8 0.3 
Source: Bouët et al (2004, 29), calculations from MAcMap database. 
 
Hence for Norway, the average for agriculture must be between 4.0 and 
79.3%, which are the averages for ad valorem and specific tariffs, 
respectively. Using the respective number of tariff lines (based on 2005 
tariffs), this would give an arithmetic average at 47%. The averages in 
Table 1 are however not arithmetic (simple), but trade-weighted. 6  
A third estimate of tariff protection for agriculture in Norway is 
provided in the recent WTO Trade Policy Review of Norway (WTO, 
2004). Here, a simple average of 38.2% for agriculture is presented, 
based on AVEs supplied by Norwegian authorities. While the methods 
are not fully explained, it seems as if 2003 Norwegian import prices have 
been used as reference prices. Since imports are zero for many items, 
AVEs are also missing and these are not included in the calculations. 
According to the WTO definition, agriculture should include 1354 tariff 
                                                 
6 The authors use a particular form of weighting; the imports of a reference group of 
countries is used to weight the various products. In order to calculate the AVEs, the 
authors use the “median unit value of world-wide exports originating from the 
reference group the exporter belongs to” (Bouët et al. 2004). These methodological 
choices may explain the differences between this study and our results. 
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lines, but only 1190 lines are included in WTOs calculations. Since 
imports are more likely missing for high-tariff products, it is likely that 
this leads to underestimation of the tariff average.  
Hence we have three different estimates of Norway’s tariff protection 
in agriculture: At 273, 47 and 38%. Which of these are correct? In the 
following, we shall make another attempt to shed light on the issue. 
3. Methodology for tariff calculations 
As noted above, a core challenge is to calculate AVEs for the specific 
tariffs. The importance of specific tariffs is evident from Table 2, which 
shows the tariff types used for agriculture in the 2005 Norwegian 
customs tariff: 7 
 
Table 2: Tariff types for Norwegian agriculture 
(a) Number of tariff lines 
 Bound MFN applied EU GSP 
Botswana 
Namibia LDCs 
Zero 254 458 625 685 1076 1284
Ad valorem>0 88 94 68 66 0 0
Specific 228 729 590 531 208 0
Either/or 714 0 0 0 0 0
Compound 0 3 1 2 0 0
       
Total 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284
MX  42 0 3 0 0
(b) Percentage distribution 
 Bound MFN applied EU GSP 
Botswana 
Namibia LDCs 
Zero 19.8 35.7 48.7 53.4 83.8 100
Ad valorem>0 6.8 7.3 5.3 5.1 0 0
Specific 17.7 56.7 45.9 41.3 16.2 0
Either/or 55.6 0 0 0 0 0
Compound 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0
       
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: In the analysis, we use tariffs applying as of 10 January 2005; files provided by 
Norwegian Customs and Excise. Some tariffs are changed throughout the year. 
 
All tariffs are bound, and for 56% there are ad valorem as well as 
specific bound rates, and the highest one applies in each case. For 255 
lines, tariffs are bound at zero. The number of lines with zero tariffs 
increases as we move to MFN applied tariffs (36% zero lines) to LDCs 
                                                 
7 In this context, we define agriculture as Chapters 1, 2, 4-24 and 35 in the Harmonised 
System (HS), with the exception of fish products. WTO normally uses a wider 
definition including leather, fur, silk, wool, cotton and some other chemicals. Using this 
definition, we would add 70 tariff lines for which MFN applied tariffs in Norway are 
zero. Averages using the WTO definition would therefore be lower. We shall comment 
on this issue when appropriate.  
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(100%). At the same time, the number of specific tariffs falls; from a 
maximum of 729 (57%) for MFN applied tariffs. 
The high incidence of specific tariffs complicates analysis of the 
import regime. In order to quantify the overall rate of protection, we 
need import prices to which the specific tariffs may be compared. Many 
of the specific tariffs are however high and more or less prohibitive, so 
there are no Norwegian imports. And where imports exist, it is likely that 
the specific tariff affects the quality of the goods imported and thereby 
the average price. Empirical trade research confirms that international 
trade prices vary considerably for similar products, and that quality 
differences constitute a major explanation for this. In the presence of a 
specific tariff, it is also more likely that high-price items are imported 
(see e.g. Hummels and Skiba 2004). Hence the use of Norwegian import 
prices may lead to under-estimation of the AVE. 
For these reasons; i.e. missing imports and endogenous import 
prices, we do not base the study primarily on import data. Instead, we 
follow Gibson et al. (2001) by using the world average import price for 
the product in question as a main approach.  We also show a second set 
of AVE calculations where we use Norwegian import prices for all 
products where imports in 2003 were larger than 250 000 NOK 
(approximately 40 000 USD), and world average import prices for the 
rest. Since we expect import prices to be more erratic when imports are 
very small, we do not include Norwegian import prices based on even 
smaller import values. For the 1284 categories covered here, we have 
import data for 2002 and 2003 for approximately 800, but almost half of 
these drop out due to the threshold. For the 729 specific MFN applied 
tariffs, we use Norwegian import prices for around half in this third set 
of calculations. 8 
When using world market prices, we also face the problem that these 
are available only at the internationally standardised 6-digit level of 
classification (630 products), while tariffs are set at the more detailed 8-
digit level of Norwegian classification (1284 products). Hence we have 
to use a common world market price for all 8-digit products that belong 
to the same 6-digit sub-heading. Since we do not know the price 
difference or the value shares for the 8-digit groups in the world market, 
this produces some inaccuracy. One might think that it would be better to 
use Norwegian import data on this to the maximum extent, even when 
import values are low. But when AVEs are several hundred percentage 
points, import prices as well as quantities may be heavily affected. We 
therefore believe that world market data are more reliable in spite of the 
inaccuracy caused by different aggregation levels. It implies, however, 
that results for individual tariff lines are less reliable than the averages 
we present. 
Table 3 sums up the prices we use to calculate the AVEs: 
 
                                                 
8 Exchanges used are 7.9702 (2002) and 7.0824 (2003) NOK/USD, from Bank of 
Norway. 
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Table 3: Prices used to calculate AVEs 
– alternative calculations presented 
Alter- 
native Tariffs 
Prices used to calculate 
AVEs 
Source of 
trade data 
(W) 
Average world import prices 
at HS 6-digit 
classification 
COMTRADE
(N+W) 
2005 
Norwegian 
tariffs at HS 
8-digit  
classification 
As (1), but replaced with 
Norwegian 8-digit import 
prices when available (390-
394 cases for MFN applied 
tariffs) 
COMTRADE 
+ Statistics 
Norway 
Note: Developing countries are defined as ODA (Official Development Assistance) 
beneficiaries according to DAC recipient list as of 1 January 2003, see web page   
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/9/2488552.pdf 
 
We expect that prices are highest for (N+W).9 While we consider (W) to 
be the main alternative, it is important to recall that there is in fact no 
objective or unique AVE. In fact, the essence of a specific tariff is 
exactly that the AVE varies with the import price, and since import 
prices vary, the AVEs also do. Tariff averages of the kind we provide 
here are for illustrative purposes, and do not change the fact that tariffs 
are indeed specific. With respect to tariffs for imports from developing 
countries, we might also plausibly have suggested using world prices for 
imports from developing countries rather than from all countries. Since it 
is likely that poor countries have lower prices, this might have produced 
even higher AVEs. Such calculations are however not included here. 
Having found the AVEs for each tariff line, a next issue is how to 
calculate averages. Using imports as weights is implausible for the 
reasons noted above: If tariffs are high enough, there are no imports and 
the weights are zero. Since there is also here no unique “truth”, we use 
the following alternative calculations: 
 
Table 4: Alternative aggregation methods 
(a) Simple average at the 8-digit HS level 
(b) Simple average at the 6-digit HS level 
(c) Average at the 6-digit HS level, weighted by world imports 
(d) Average at the 6-digit HS level, weighted by world imports from 
developing countries. 
  
The simple average (a) is affected by the number of Norwegian tariff 
lines. This is corrected for in (b) where we first aggregate to the 6-digit 
                                                 
9 Bouët et al. (2004) use median prices for the exports of a reference group of countries 
for calulating AVEs. This has some advantages, but for trade between countries at 
different price/ income levels it may imply underestimation of tariffs facing low-price 
suppliers, and an over-estimation of tariffs facing high-price suppliers.  Since imports 
from developing countries are important in our context, we choose world import prices 
that are more “neutral”, and hopefully also more reliable due to the larger volume 
traded. 
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level (using a simple average if there are more 8-digit tariff lines for a 6-
digit sub-heading), and then calculate simple averages of the 6-digit sub-
headings. In (c) and (d) we use world trade data as weights. Norway has 
low tariffs for e.g. tropical fruit and some other products of particular 
interest for developing countries. If this dominates, we expect the 
averages (c) to be higher than the averages (d). As we shall see, this is 
indeed the case. 
With two price data options and four aggregation methods, we obtain 
8 different AVE tariff averages. We undertake the calculations using 
trade data for 2002 and 2003. Since world trade data are not yet available 
for 2004, we use these years also for Norwegian import data (we 
combine data in USD and NOK and these must be from the same time 
period).  
Hence for each tariff aggregate (bound, MFN applied, EU, GSP etc.) 
we have 16 different estimates for the AVE average. In the calculations, 
we include the following tariffs: 
- Bound tariffs. 
- MFN applied tariffs. 
- EU tariffs (these are mostly identical to EEA tariffs). 
- GSP tariffs, 
- Tariffs for Botswana/ Namibia, which receive special preferences in 
Norway for manufacturing as well as agriculture. 
Tariffs for LDCs are not included, for the simple reason that they are all 
zero. For more explanation about the difference between various 
regimes, see also Melchior (2005). These differences will become 
evident from the results as well. 
4. Results 
With five missing price observations, we end up with 1279 tariff lines. 
Diagram 1 shows the distribution of MFN applied tariffs, using world 
import prices (option W).10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A detailed table with AVE tariffs for each tariff line is available upon request (see 
also www.nupi.no) As noted, the use of 6-digit world prices to determine 8-digit AVEs 
implies that results for individual items are less reliable than the averages. Hence tariffs 
for individual items should be treated with some caution, and it should preferably be 
checked that there is no aggregation problem (6 versus 8 digits) with respect to prices. 
The bias for individual tariff lines may go either way.   
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Diagram 1: MFN applied tariffs for Norwegian agriculture, 
with ad valorem equivalents for specific tariffs
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As also shown in Table 2, 459 tariff lines or 36% are zero. If we had 
used the WTO definition of agriculture, we could have added another 70 
lines with zero tariffs, so the share would be even higher.  
After 36%, however, the free trade story is gone and there is no end 
to the height of tariffs. When we pass the 100% tariff level, 28% of the 
tariff lines remain. Surpassing 300%, there are still 10% or more than 
100 tariff lines left.  
In Table 5, we show the 16 alternative averages for the five tariff 
regimes mentioned above. 
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Table 5: Norwegian tariff averages for agriculture 
Simple 
HS8 
Simple 
HS6 
Weighted 
by world 
imports 
Weigthed 
by imp. 
from dev.
countries
Which tariff: 
Prices 
used for 
calcula- 
ting 
AVE 
Year 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
N+W 77.4 81.0 76.9 57.3 
W 
2002 
96.5 101.7 103.0 74.0 
N+W 75.5 79.0 73.4 54.2 
MFN applied  
tariffs 
W 
2003 
95.8 101.0 100.4 73.2 
N+W 156.1 162.0 153.9 105.4 
W 
2002 
167.5 173.6 170.4 117.8 
N+W 152.5 156.8 150.7 103.1 
Bound tariffs 
W 
2003 
164.1 168.2 166.1 115.7 
N+W 73.7 78.5 74.1 55.4 
W 
2002 
92.1 98.7 99.7 71.6 
N+W 72.3 77.2 70.6 52.3 
EU tariffs 
W 
2003 
91.8 98.7 96.9 70.7 
N+W 63.7 68.0 66.9 48.8 
W 
2002 
78.2 85.3 89.7 62.7 
N+W 62.2 66.9 63.8 46.2 
GSP tariffs 
W 
2003 
78.1 85.5 87.2 62.2 
N+W 15.5 18.1 14.9 13.1 
W 
2002 
17.8 22.2 17.2 13.9 
N+W 14.4 16.8 14.9 14.5 
Tariffs for 
Botswana and 
Namibia 
W 
2003 
17.4 22.0 17.6 15.9 
Number of observations 1283 630 630 630 
Note: W = world import prices, N+W = Norwegian import prices + world import 
prices, as explained in text. 
 
The ranking of the regimes is as we would expect, with bound tariffs as 
the highest, followed by MFN applied tariffs and the preferential 
regimes. Observe that GSP tariff are lower than tariffs for the EU. 
Botswana and Namibia have tariffs considerably below all the others; 
but not zero as for the LDCs. 
Considering the different averages in each case, we find that: 
- As expected; tariff averages are higher if we use only world market 
prices (results with prices W > results with prices N+W in all cases). 
Hence Norwegian import prices under the current regime are 
generally higher than world averages. The difference between 
averages calculated with the two alternative price data is generally 
quite large; around 20% for MFN applied tariffs. 
- The difference between 6-digit and 8-digit aggregation is modest, but 
nevertheless with systematically higher averages at the 6-digit level 
(b>a). 
- Weighting by world trade leads to small changes in the estimates, but 
a slight reduction in the majority of cases (c<b, comparison has to be 
undertaken at 6-digit level of aggregation).  
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- Weighting by imports from developing countries, however, changes 
the results considerably (d<a,b,c): MFN applied tariffs are 20-30% 
lower if weighted with developing country trade instead of world 
trade. This shows that the tariff regime is more liberal versus 
developing countries, and that protection is higher for products 
exported from industrial countries.  
- Estimates are mostly lower when 2003 data are used, compared to 
2002. This may be due to exchange rate or import price fluctuation, 
and illustrates that in general, the ad valorem impact of specific 
tariffs may change over time. 
The results suggest that the Norwegian tariff average is generally around 
73-103% for MFN applied tariffs, and 54-74% if we consider imports 
from developing countries. For bound tariffs, the average is in the range 
151-174% (103-118 if weighted by developing country exports). 
Hence our result is considerably below the 273% presented by Cline 
(2002), but significantly above the figures presented by WTO (2004). As 
noted, the latter calculations were undertaken with a reduced number of 
observations, and this may be the explanation, in addition to the use of 
import prices. Note also that the WTO agricultural aggregate contains 69 
more tariff lines that are all zero, so our unweighted averages may be 
multiplied by 0.95 to be made comparable to the WTO figures. The 
prices used for AVE calculations may also be a reason why our average 
is higher than the one based on Boüet et al. (2004). 
It should be observed that the highest tariffs tend to inflate the 
averages. On the other hand, the median would not give a reliable picture 
either. Hence the most representative summary of tariffs is the one in 
Diagram 1, and the averages should be treated with some caution.  
Diagram 2 shows the tariff level in different sectors of agriculture, 
using HS Chapters.  
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Diagram 2: Norwegian agriculture: Tariffs in different sectors
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As also shown by Dimaran and McDougall (2002) and WTO (2004), 
protection is highest for meat products and dairy products. For animal 
feedstuff, protection is also high. For some fruit and vegetable products, 
tariffs are zero when the goods are for human consumption, and high if 
they are feedstuff. This contributes to higher tariffs in these sectors.  
Observe that it is not evident that there is strong tariff escalation; i.e. 
higher tariffs for processed goods. We may observe that the tariffs for 
meat products are not higher than for meat, but on the other hand, mill 
products are more protected than cereals, and vegetable and food 
products are somewhat more protected than fruit and vegetables. The 
impression concerning tariff escalation is therefore ambiguous, and a 
closer examination is needed to provide a clear answer. 
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5. The GSP system 
While the LDCs face zero tariffs in Norway also for agriculture, ordinary 
GSP implies tariff cuts that vary across products according to sensitivity. 
Diagram 3 shows the distribution of cuts (i.e. GSP tariff in % of the 
MFN tariff). We drop the 36% of lines where the MFN tariff is zero; the 
distribution therefore ends at 64%, to the right in the diagram. 
 
Diagram 3: Norwegian agriculture - GSP rate in % of MFN 
applied rate
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Hence 17.5% of the tariff lines are reduced to zero, while around 40% 
obtain cuts in the range 10-15%. On average, GSP implies a tariff cut of  
13-18.5% of the MFN rate, depending on the weighting and the AVE 
calculations applied. Since many tariffs are prohibitive, however, the real 
increase in market access with tariff cuts of 10-15% is uncertain in many 
cases.  
For manufacturing, the Norwegian GSP system has traditionally been 
inferior to free trade agreements in terms of market access. Only in the 
last decade have the two systems converged in terms of the depth of 
tariff cuts. It is therefore interesting to observe that for agriculture, GSP 
is in fact more “generous” that the European FTAs. Diagram 4 shows the 
tariff cuts obtained by the EU.  
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Diagram 4: Norwegian agriculture - EU rate in % of MFN 
applied rate
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For a considerable share of non-zero tariff lines, EU has obtained no 
tariff cuts. The average tariff cut for the EU is only 3-4%; i.e. more 
limited than for GSP.  
6. Tariff exemptions 
The analysis of tariffs above does not provide a complete picture of the 
tariff regime. In fact, these tariffs do not always apply. There are three 
types of deviations: 
- Norway applies a number of tariff rate quotas (TRQs), with reduced 
tariffs within some quantitative ceilings. Such TRQs exist for MFN, 
GSP and EU tariffs. 
- Second, individual tariff suspensions may be granted. In 2003, more 
than 2600 individual tariff suspensions or reductions were granted, 
e.g. for inputs or to the processing industry.11 
- Third, general tariff reductions may me granted throughout the year. 
In 2003, 322 such tariff reduction were given for individual tariff 
lines. For cereals, tariffs change over time due to the target price 
system; in which tariffs should correspond to the gap between target 
prices and world market prices. 
Due to these deviations, the tariffs listed in the Customs Tariff 
publication, which we have also used as the basis for analysis, do not 
always apply. According to Norwegian Customs and Excise, these tariffs 
should be regarded as upper bounds. Administratively, tariffs for 
agriculture are managed directly by the Norwegian Agricultural 
Authority – not Norwegian Customs and Excise. Hence NAA announce 
                                                 
11 See. St.prp. nr. 1, 2004-2005, Skatte-, avgifts- og tollvedtak, p. 89. 
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changes in agricultural tariffs directly in the TVINN tariff clearance 
system. 
For trade, it may be a problem that tariffs are variable. Firms have 
entry costs when trading with new suppliers, and have to make their 
calculations about how much to invest in getting trade off the ground. If 
they believe the tariff is 30% but then it turns out to be 60%, it may be a 
problem. Variable tariffs may create a problem of lacking predictability 
and work as a non-tariff barriers. Some of the importers interviewed 
raised this as a problem of the Norwegian system. 
We do not have documentation to provide a further analysis of the 
general and individual tariff reductions.12 On TRQs, however, we shall 
provide an overview – although not a full analysis of their impact. 
7. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
Tariff rate quotas imply that lower tariffs apply within quantitative 
ceilings. After the UR Agreement, Norway bound approximately 300 
TRQs in the WTO. Norway is in fact one of the countries worldwide 
using this instrument most frequently.13 There are currently 
approximately 60 active TRQs in Norway.14 For approximately half of 
these, tariffs are fully eliminated within quotas, for the other ones tariffs 
are reduced.  
Some types of TRQs provide enhanced market access. These are: 
- Minimum access quotas under the WTO: Some quotas are there in 
order to fulfil the requirement from the Uruguay Round that at least 
5% of consumption should be imported. There are ten such quotas. 
- TRQs under free trade arrangements; notably for the EU: There are 
currently 19 TRQs for imports from the EU, with the number 
increasing after negotiations in 2003. 
- TRQs under the GSP system: There are eight such quotas. 
For the GSP quotas and most EU quotas, in-quota tariffs are zero. For 
the WTO quotas and a few EU quotas, tariff reductions within quotas are 
partial.  
These TRQs provide additional market access beyond ordinary MFN 
tariffs. In addition, there is a particular regime for grains and oilseeds.15 
Here there are specific target prices, and the cooperative firm 
Felleskjøpet has the role of “market regulator” (making recommendation 
                                                 
12 We also drop an examination of special tariff arrangements for processed goods, the 
so-called raw material compensation (“RÅK”) arrangements. 
13 St.meld. nr. 65, 1993-1994, Special Appendix, Norges bindingslister for varer og 
tjenester, p. 54ff. See also Skully (2001) for an overview. 
14 See St.prp. nr. 1, 2004-2005, Skatte-, avgifts- og tollvedtak, Appendix 2, or 
Appendix to Forskrift om fordeling av tollkvoter for landbruksvarer, Appendix, first 
issued 20 June 2003, available at http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/ld/ld-20030620-
0907.html 
15 For information about the cereal import regime, see St.prp. nr. 1, 2004-2005, pp. 91 
ff., and Norwegian Agricultural Authority, Circular 46/2004, 21 July 2004, or Circular 
59/2003, 24 June 2003. On auctions, see e.g. Norwegian Agricultural Authority, 2005, 
”Resultater av auksjoner gjennomført i 2004”, and ”Foreløpig oversikt over 
auksjonskvoter og tidsplaner for auksjoner i 2005”, available at www.slf.dep.no. Some 
special TRQs (e.g. elk meat) are not mentioned here in order to avoid detail; 
information may be found at the web page. 
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on imports and tariffs). Felleskjøpet makes an assessment of the need for 
imports, based on the domestic demand and supply. The proportion of 
food grain in Norwegian production varies considerably over time due to 
weather conditions etc., and the import quotas have to be adjusted 
accordingly.16 The tariff is set to make up for the difference between 
world market prices and the Norwegian target prices. In 2004, tariffs 
were at 8-52% of the MFN bound tariff. The bound tariffs apply if 
anyone would try to import outside the auction system. There are 
meetings between Felleskjøpet, the Norwegian Agricultural Authority 
and importers to discuss the market situation and the planned imports. 
Quotas for food grain, feed grain and oilseeds are thereafter auctioned. 
This occurs three times a year, and the tariff is adjusted for each period. 
Felleskjøpet has different regional companies, and is taken together the 
dominating importer (approximately 2/3 of imports). The grain regime 
has a certain collusive flavour, and the auction price is surprisingly 
stable at 0.01 NOK/kg. As one importer stated: “10 NOK/tonne is almost 
a magical limit.” 
To an increasing extent, the Norwegian TRQs are auctioned. In 2004, 
40 out of 59 quotas were auctioned. Data from the auctions are available 
and provide useful information in order to assess the value of the TRQs, 
and the improved market access they offer. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to provide a full assessment, but some evidence will be presented.  
As an illustration, imagine that a product has a tariff at 200%, but a 
certain quantity x may be imported with only 50% tariffs. Assume 
further that the 200% tariff is prohibitive, so there is “water in the tariff” 
–  imports will only take place if the tariff is 100% or lower. In a market 
with many competing importers, these should then be willing to pay 50% 
of the import price for the quota.  
For some TRQs, this description may fit as an approximation. 
Consider, for example, the WTO minimum access quota for frozen 
bovine meat. Within this quota, beef from e.g. Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay is imported. For some of the products included, the ordinary 
tariff is 119 NOK/kg, while the in-quota tariff is 33.60, or 28% of the 
MFN tariff. For this item, there have been more than 30 bidders and the 
quota price during auctions has increased over time, to 23 NOK in the 
auctions for 2005. According to the stylised story above, the prohibitive 
tariff would be around 23+33.60=56.60 NOK/kg. Due to the high 
specific tariff, imports are mainly high-priced items such as tenderloin.  
Considering that the Norwegian import price for tenderloin etc. in 2003 
was 43 NOK, the tariff + auction price was at 133% of the import price. 
With a world market price for boneless meat at 15 NOK, imports of such 
goods would not be profitable. The auction price suggests that there may 
be considerable “water in the tariff” – more than 60 NOK for the high-
price meat if the model illustration above fits.   
Among the TRQs under GSP, there is at least one similar story; for 
honey: The MFN tariff for honey is 21 NOK/kg, or equivalent to 140% 
of the world market price. In 2003, the world market price for honey was 
17.44 NOK/kg whereas the Norwegian import price was 20.72. The in-
                                                 
16 See Budsjettnemnda for jordbruket (2005, 45). 
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quota tariff is zero. The quota price has been fluctuating between 6 and 
10 NOK/kg, with 6-10 bidders. A quota price at 10 NOK is equivalent to 
a tax of around 50%. The cooperative firm Honningsentralen is the 
largest importer (and also the “market regulator), and some other 
importers may sell their share of the quota imports to Honningsentralen. 
No firm can buy more than 50% of the auctioned quota. Honey imports 
have to conform to EU/ European health standards, and LDCs have 
problems with this. This is a main reason why importers pay 6-10 
NOK/kg to import from ordinary developing countries, even if they can 
import without tariffs from the LDCs.  
Also in the case of the TRQs for imports from the EU, it is the case 
that quota prices have excelled only in some markets. This has occurred 
for ham and sausages, with prices reaching 25-31 NOK/kg. Common to 
TRQs for MFN, GSP and EU is nevertheless that these examples; with 
sharp competition bidding up quota prices, is the exception rather than 
the rule. In several cases, quota prices are low, and in some cases, quota 
utilisation is also low. 
Quota utilisation has been good for the TRQs for impirts from the 
EU in the majority of cases (14 out of 19 in 2005), and for the WTO 
quotas in most cases (all but one in 2005). For GSP quotas, the picture is 
more mixed: Four out of the eight GSP quotas are not used very much, 
and the quota price for these is zero or close to zero.17 Three of these are 
quotas for vegetables.  
One might believe that low quota prices would correspond to low 
quota utilisation. This is true in one sense: If quota utilisation is low, the 
quota price is also low. With high quota utilisation, however, it is not 
necessarily the case that the quota price is high. For all types of quotas, 
there are examples of quota prices being very low even if utilisation is 
high. There are different possible reasons for this: 
- There may be collusive behaviour so that bidders have a tacit 
understanding of keeping prices low. This is more likely in markets 
with few participants. For imports from developing countries, there 
may be high entry costs so that new importers do not want to take the 
risk to challenge the established importers. This may reduce 
competition and render collusive behaviour more likely. 
- For WTO quotas, where tariff reductions are partial, it may be the 
case that the remaining tariff is still so high that imports are not 
profitable if higher quota prices are added.  
- For imports from some developing countries, high entry costs may 
also imply that even a modest quota price can make imports 
unprofitable. The regime with zero tariffs for LDCs illustrates the 
relevance of this point:  Little imports have entered in spite of zero 
tariffs for agriculture.  
- It should be recalled that parts of Norwegian agriculture are close to 
autarky so there may be high costs of establishing new imports. 
Reduced competition for quotas is then more likely. 
                                                 
17 In 2005, utilisation was 1-20% for these quotas. 
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The hypothesis about collusive behaviour is supported by the fact 
that there is a fairly strong relationship between the number of bidders 
and the quota price. This is shown in Diagram 5.  
 
Diagram 5: Quota prices versus the number of bidders in 
TRQ auctions, Norway 2003 
Data for 79 auctions from www.slf.dep.no
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There is a positive correlation between the number of bidders and the 
auction price. This suggests that the extent of competition in each market 
is important, although a full test has to take into account also other 
aspects that affects the quota price. For the so-called “open ascending 
auctions” used in Norway, the risk of collusion has been noted by some 
authors (see e.g. Sunnevåg 2001, Jörin and Campo 2005). Some of the 
Norwegian auction markets for TRQs have a collusive flavour, and in 
some cases (e.g. cereals and honey), the market regulators play a 
dominating role. 
The quota price should be increasing with the magnitude of the tariff 
rebate. This is statistically confirmed, but the relationship is not very 
strong. An appropriate test should however correct for “water in the 
tariffs”, and we do not have data to undertake this. 
An illustration of the importance of various TRQs is the amount of 
revenue collected from the auctions. Arranging auctions with respect to 
the year of importation, we obtain the following picture:18 
 
                                                 
18 Diagrams 5 and 6 are both based on information from the Norwegian Agricultural 
Authority web page www.slf.dep.no. World market prices used for Diagram 5 are 
based on COMTRADE data. 
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Diagram 6: Revenue from TRQ auctions for imports in 2002-
2005
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Here the WTO TRQs and the grain quotas have been merged. It is 
evident that the WTO quotas loom largest. Here more than 25 mill. NOK 
of the revenue for 2005 came from beef alone. For GSP, almost all came 
from honey. For the EU, most of the revenue came from ham and 
sausages. Hence the products mentioned above were the main auction 
successes.  
Some quotas are however not yet auctioned; in particular the 
important quota of 4000 tons of cheese from the EU is not auctioned, but 
allocated based on historical performance. This amounts to a tariff 
exemption of 108 mill. NOK; i.e. more than the revenue from all 
auctions combined. The government has wanted to auction also this 
quota, but has faced opposition from established importers. Given that 
auctions imply that the rents are taxed away, importers with earlier 
quotas may prefer to keep profits for themselves. On the other hand, 
interviews confirmed that importers value the openness and opportunity 
for all firms to compete. A few of them complained about too little 
information; e.g. one importer missed an auction by mistake and could 
not continue imports that had taken place regularly for many years.  
In spite of potential collusion in some auctions, the system has to be 
commended for its transparency: All auction results, with bids, prices 
and the names of firms is openly accessible at the internet, for current 
auctions as well as four years back in time.  
As noted, the LDCs face zero tariffs so there is no need for TRQs for 
them. The former LDC Botswana has however grown richer, and does 
not benefit from the LDC tariff regime. Together with Namibia, 
Botswana has nevertheless continued to obtain special trade preferences 
in Norway. In the field of agriculture, we have already seen that tariffs 
are lower.  In addition, there is a special tariff-free quota at 2700 tons for 
bovine meat from Botswana and Namibia, which is allocated on a first 
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come first serve basis with zero tariffs. This allows imports of chilled 
meat as well as frozen (contrary to the WTO bovine quota, which is only 
for frozen meat). Most of these imports are to the processing industry, 
whereas e.g. imports from Brazil under the WTO quota are mainly high-
priced consumer items such as tenderloin. Considering that importers 
pay 57 NOK/kg for importing from e.g. Brazil, the quota for Botswana 
and Namibia is attractive. A London-based agent has been important for 
setting up this trade link. According to some importers, the number of 
potential suppliers in Botswana is limited, so the market is “taken” and 
impossible for new importers to enter even if there is no tariff. Hence 
there seems to be a monopoly-like situation. An issue in such cases is 
who captures the rent; exporters, middlemen, importers, manufacturing 
firms or consumers. Although we are not able to provide a precise 
answer, our impression is that at least exporters, middlemen and 
importers get some.  
8. Norwegian agricultural protection and the export interests 
of developing countries 
As noted above, the tariff structure of Norway is skewed in the favour of 
developing countries; i.e. tariffs are lower when weighted by developing 
country exports. This does not, however, imply that developing countries 
generally face low tariffs.  
Table 6 provides summary statistics of Norway’s GSP tariff 
averages, combined with data for DC and LDC exports (Their share in 
world exports for each HS chapter). The table also includes a 
concentration index of the form ∑isi2, where si are the share of each DC 
in the total world imports from DCs within the HS Chapter. If one DC 
has all DC exports, the concentration index will be one. If trade is more 
evenly divided, it is lower (the minimum is close to zero). For items with 
a low concentration index, trade liberalization will benefit more 
countries. In the table, we have ranked HS chapters according to the 
share of developing countries in world exports.19 
 
                                                 
19 We use OECDs list of countries entitled to ODA (Official Development Assistance) 
as the developing country definition. 
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Table 6: Developing country shares of world import of agricultural goods 
World imports 
2003 from: 
% shares of world 
imports 2003 for: HS Chap- 
ter 
Short  
description Developing
countries LDCs 
Developing
countries LDCs 
Concen-
tration 
index for  
DC exports 
GSP 
tariff 
average 
(type 1a)
9 Coffee etc 9901 1036 75.6 7.9 0.07 0 
14 Straw etc 348 17 71.2 3.5 0.10 0 
8 Fruit 20954 344 51.6 0.8 0.06 9.9 
15 Fats 14235 105 51.0 0.4 0.21 35.3 
23 Res animal feed 9693 64 40.7 0.3 0.22 169.4 
5 Animal pr 1502 8 40.0 0.2 0.29 12.1 
12 Oilseed 10950 330 39.8 1.2 0.27 84.1 
17 Sugar 6135 179 38.4 1.1 0.09 34.8 
18 Cocoa 7135 113 38.3 0.6 0.21 12.0 
20 Veg fruit prod 8415 16 34.4 0.1 0.13 59.1 
13 Rubber etc 881 76 32.2 2.8 0.12 0 
7 Vegetables 8710 414 31.9 1.5 0.16 41.3 
16 Meat prod 2006 0 28.8 0.0 0.16 331.1 
10 Cereals 9301 64 28.7 0.2 0.15 85 
24 Tobacco 5073 517 24.0 2.4 0.10 0 
6 Plants 2208 75 19.4 0.7 0.12 41.6 
1 Animals 1522 131 17.1 1.5 0.18 122.5 
11 Mill prod 804 11 14.9 0.2 0.10 106.4 
2 Meat 6624 30 14.3 0.1 0.26 336.3 
21 Sauces etc 3043 6 13.8 0.0   7.3 
22 Beverages 6231 25 13.6 0.1 0.16 8.8 
19 Cereal prod 2446 8 11.6 0.0 0.10 30.3 
35 Proteins 948 2 7.8 0.0 0.16 27.5 
4 Milk 1997 21 6.3 0.1 0.08 144.6 
 
Developing country shares are highest for chapters 9 and 14 where tariffs 
are already zero. Milk products and proteins etc. (Chapter 35) are the 
other extreme, with little exports from developing countries. Meat 
products are intermediate, but faces very high tariffs.  
Grains and particularly feedstuff are among the goods that face stiff 
protection. When the LDCs obtained zero tariffs for all goods, this was 
the last product group to be included, and for these goods there is still a 
safeguard/ surveillance system so restrictions may be reinstated if the 
“market balance” is threatened. 
For some chapters, the Norwegian trade regime is liberal for products 
for human consumption, while feedstuffs are protected. Table 7 shows 
what impact this protection of feedstuffs has on tariffs. Here we have 
picked the 153 categories where it is explicitly mentioned in the tariff 
line description that products are for animal feeding. Some other 
products could also be used for feedstuff, e.g. some cereals, but these are 
not included. Hence Table 7 shows a lower bound for how the protection 
of feedstuffs affects the tariff levels. This time we have ranked the HS 
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chapters according to the reduction in the GSP tariff average. The tops 
sectors are also indicated in bold in Table 6. 
 
Table 7: How the protection of feedstuffs affects the tariff level 
MFN applied GSP HS 
chapter Short description Old New % red. Old New % red.
5 Animal pr 13.5 0 100 12.1 0 100 
15 Fats 41.8 8.9 79 35.3 5.7 84 
10 Cereals 94.5 38.4 59 85 34.6 59 
17 Sugar 41.7 19.7 53 34.8 15 57 
23 Res animal feed 196.1 105.3 46 175.9 94.3 46 
12 Oilseed 98 56.1 43 84.1 47.7 43 
11 Mill prod 119.8 68.1 43 106.4 60.5 43 
8 Fruit 19.4 18.1 7 9.9 8.7 12 
7 Vegetables 66 61.5 7 41.3 37.2 10 
35 Proteins 57.9 56.4 3 27.5 26.4 4 
20 Veg fruit prod 93.5 92.4 1 59.1 58.1 2 
19 Cereal prod 44.1 43.7 1 30.3 29.8 1 
1 Animals 169.6 169.6 0 122.5 122.5 0 
2 Meat 372.5 372.5 0 336.3 336.3 0 
4 Milk 160.5 160.5 0 144.6 144.6 0 
6 Plants 50.2 50.2 0 41.6 41.6 0 
16 Meat prod 367.9 367.9 0 331.1 331.1 0 
18 Cocoa 15.9 15.9 0 12 12 0 
21 Sauces etc 13.4 13.4 0 7.3 7.3 0 
22 Beverages 15.9 15.9 0 8.8 8.8 0 
9 Coffee etc 0 0   0 0   
13 Rubber etc 0.5 0.5 0 0 0   
14 Straw etc 0 0   0 0   
24 Tobacco 0 0   0 0   
Total  95.8 81.5 15 78.1 65.3 16 
 
The columns “new” shows the tariff average if the 153 feedstuff 
categories are set at zero. This leads to an overall reduction of 15-16% 
for MFN as well as GSP tariffs. For some chapters that are very 
important in the exports of developing countries (5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 
23), the elimination of tariffs for feedstuffs leads to a considerable cut in 
the tariff average. These are marked in bold in both tables. 
Now the point is that the majority of top sectors in Table 7 are also 
among the sectors ranked high in Table 6. In other words: The protection 
of feedstuff hits several sectors of particular importance in the exports of 
developing countries. Protection of feedstuffs is therefore a feature of 
agricultural trade protection in Norway that is negative for developing 
countries. 
Protection of grains and feedstuff has however been a cornerstone in 
Norwegian post-war agricultural policy: The so-called “channelling 
policy” is a special construct in this policy. When overproduction started 
to emerge around 1950, a deliberate choice was made to stimulate grain 
production in the most fertile land areas (especially in South East 
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Norway). In this way, livestock production could be located in more 
peripheral areas. In order to achieve this, the relative prices had to be 
changed to make grain production in the central areas more profitable. 
According to Vatn (1989), the policy was successful, except that more 
than planned of livestock production was located in the relatively fertile 
areas of South West Norway (Jæren). For a discussion, see also 
Aanesland (2002). In later periods, preparedness for conflict was also an 
argument for supporting grain production.20  
A considerable share of Norwegian grain production is for animal 
feed; approximately ¾ in 2004.21 This share varies over time due to the 
quality of each harvest. Wheat and rye are the main types of food grain, 
while oat and barley are mainly for animal feed. Due to recent 
overproduction of food grain, the government has recently announced 
that the price gap between food grain and feed grain should be reduced.22 
During the last two decades, the share of food grain produced 
domestically has increased, but with considerable fluctuations from year 
to year (see Budsjettnemnde for jordbruket 2005, 45).  
As a result of this policy over 50 years, there is considerable grain 
production in South East Norway (84% of nationwide cereal production 
in 2004).23 Since food grain and feed grain are inter-related, the support 
policy for grain also implies that the feed costs in other agricultural 
production is raised considerably. Diagram 7 shows the share of forage 
(“kraftfor”) in total costs except labour costs in Norwegian agriculture. 
This share is 25% for all farms nationwide, and 30% for milk/bovine 
farms- Milk/bovine farms are particularly important for regional 
employment. If we include labour compensation, the cost share of forage 
is lower, but nevertheless considerable. In the model of Gaasland (2003), 
this share is 16.4%. 
 
                                                 
20 Grain embargos during the first world war and the Napoleon wars in the 17th century 
had detrimental effects for Norway, and proponents of agriculture in Norway believe 
this is still a risk. 
21 Based on data from Statistics Norway,  http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/04/10/korn/tab-
2005-02-18-02.html.  
22 St.prp. nr. 69, 2004-2005, Om jordbruksoppgjøret 2005 – endringer i statsbudsjettet 
for 2005 m.m., pages 48, 65. 
23 Data source: Statistics Norway (2005). According to Budsjettnemnda for jordbruket 
(2005, 56), the share was somewhat lower. 
22       Arne Melchior 
  
Diagram 7: The share of forage ("kraftfor") in total costs in 
agriculture, Norway 2003
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Considering the magnitude of current tariffs24, trade liberalization could 
probably cut the forage price to less than half of the current level (see 
e.g. Mittenzwei and Nersten 2004). This would amount to a cost 
reduction of close to 10% for milk and livestock producers. Cheaper 
forage could therefore contribute significantly to reducing the costs of 
agricultural policy in Norway.25 Brunstad et al. (1995, 118) examine how 
production should be optimally adjusted to maintain certain policy goals, 
and find that grain production would be scaled down considerably. A 
challenge in this context is how to maintain production in peripheral 
areas: Allowing more milk/bovine production in South East Norway 
necessarily entails reduced production in the peripheries. This effect 
could be dampened by production-neutral support. A more detailed 
analysis is beyond the scope of this study; we conclude by observing that 
liberalizing forage imports from developing countries could cut costs in 
Norwegian agriculture significantly. 
8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have shown that Norwegian agriculture is well 
protected by tariffs. Even if 36% of the tariff lines are zero, some tariffs 
are extremely high and the ad valorem equivalents suggest that the 
highest ones can be measured in thousands of percentage points. These 
                                                 
24 See e.g. Norwegian Agricultural Authority, Circular 46/2004, 21 July 2004. 
25 Forage can to a varying extent be substituted for fodder (grass). On the cost of grass 
production in Norway, see Stornes (2003). 
                                                                                           The Norwegian import regime for agriculture       23 
  
tariffs are one of the elements at the WTO negotiating table. How will 
they be affected? 
This is too early to say, since an agreement in the field is not yet 
close. Recently, a method was agreed in the WTO negotiations on a 
formula for calculating AVEs.26 These AVEs will be used to place 
product in different tiers, which will be subject to different tariff cuts. 
The method relies mainly on import prices, however with a lower 
threshold than applied here. COMTRADE world price data are used if 
import prices are not available or not reliable, subject to a specific 
checking methodology. These calculations are undertaken only for 
bound tariffs. Comparing to the AVE equivalents calculated here, there 
is a high correlation (above 0.9), but the average of our calculations are 
somewhat higher: The WTO method gives an average of 106.5 for the 
specific tariffs, while we obtain 122 using Norwegian + world prices, or 
160 using world prices.  
We undertake an illustrative calculation with a tiered formula as 
follows: 40% tariff cuts in the range 0-15 , 50% in the range 15-90, and 
60% cuts if tariffs are above 90%. Using our results, we find that the 
average cut in bound tariffs will be close to 60%, and this will lead to a 
cut in MFN tariffs at above 40%. If some “sensitive” tariff lines could be 
exempted from such a formula, it could affect the average considerably 
if the high-tariff items are taken out. These are proposals included in the 
so-called Harbinson proposal from 2003. In addition, some countries 
have suggested a ceiling for tariffs; capping all tariffs above a certain 
level. In this way, we would be able to show all tariffs in our graphs. On 
the other hand, it is uncertain how much “water” there is even in the 
applied tariffs. It is likely that many of the mega-tariffs may be cut 
considerably without having an impact on trade at all. Mapping the 
prohibitive tariff levels would be a useful extension of the analysis 
undertaken here. 
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